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ABSTRACT 
This study examines identity theft, specifically, the mechanisms through which individuals 
protect themselves using credit monitoring information. As an adaptive protective response 
against identity theft, we conceptualize credit monitoring information as an information product. 
By integrating protection motivation theory with the extended parallel process model, we seek to 
understand how individuals either take adaptive recommended actions or maladaptive ones. A 
research model, hypotheses, and an experiment are described. 
Keywords: identity theft, credit monitoring, data breach, extended parallel process model 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, security breaches (e.g. Target, Home Depot, Anthem) involving the exposure of 
several millions of individuals’ personally identifiable information (PII) fill the news. Individuals 
face great financial and psychological risks from security breaches that result in identity theft 
(Sharp et al. 2004). According to Javelin (2015), in 2105 more than 13.1 million adults in the 
U.S became victims of identity theft (IDT) and lost a total of $15 billion to thieves. With identity 
related theft activities at the forefront of Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) consumer complaint 
in 15 consecutive years (FTC 2015), there is a need to understand how individuals cope with and 
respond to these issues using information systems. IDT refers to the misuse of another person’s 
personal information to commit fraud (Gonzales and Majoras 2007). While IDT has become a 
focus for regulators, organizations and individuals, there is scant empirical and theoretical based 
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research in this area (Hemphill 2001; Milne 2003), especially as it relates to individuals’ 
financial and personal well-being. Hence, this study focuses on how individuals protect 
themselves using credit monitoring information (CMI). The following research question is  
identified,  what are the effects of identity theft on the individual’s motivation to adopt credit 
monitoring information protection? We propose a model that integrates both protection 
motivation theory (PMT) and extended parallel process model (EPPM) to explain the process 
through which individuals either take an adaptive coping response or a maladaptive coping 
response. The combination portrays a nuanced picture anchored on the importance of studying 
how and why individuals take protective mechanisms to protect against IDT, choose to do 
nothing, or reject the message outright. By including financial well-being as a personal relevance 
construct (Johnston et al. 2015) specific to the IDT, we extend PMT in information security 
research. For practice, in highlighting these alternate paths, we explicate factors contributing to 
maladaptive response and how organization’s users can be trained to accept future messages. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The individual’s identity can be a combination or a subset of PII that includes but is not limited 
to the individual’s name, social security number, driver’s license, financial account numbers 
(FTC 2015), and tightly linked to both the person’s financial history and future. It is the form of 
identity needed in order to secure a home mortgage or employment. Identity theft can occur 
offline and online (Lai et al. 2012). Prior IDT research include its effect on payment systems 
(Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra 2015), IDT cycle (Albrecht et al. 2011), and fear of identity theft 
(Roberts et al. 2013). As a step to mitigate the threat of IDT or reduce the impact, it is a 
generally accepted notion that a quick discovery of the theft limits the attendant damages 
(Anderson 2005). This quick discovery is usually accomplished with credit monitoring 
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information.  Credit monitoring utilizes an information system to regularly monitor a person’s 
financial information against fraudulent activities, and assists in reconciling and cleaning 
questionable transactions (Johnson 2011). Credit monitoring information is a protective measure 
against economic harm due to identity theft (Johnson 2011). Following Raghunathan and Sarkar 
(2016), we conceptualize credit monitoring as an information product. The primary objective of 
consumers of an information product is to “obtain a reliable estimate of some quantity of interest 
that will help her make a sound decision” (p. 111). Similarly, in our case, the consumer’s 
objective is to receive information regarding suspicious financial activities, in order to help 
resolve the issue. We define the individual’s intention to use CMI as a protective behavior that 
individuals voluntarily engage for protecting against IDT.  PMT suggests that individuals facing 
a threat will appraise the threat through their perceptions of severity of and their vulnerability to 
the threat. In addition, individuals appraise the effectiveness of a coping response (Maddux and 
Rogers 1983; Rogers 1975). PMT’s criticisms is that it does not specify when and why people 
reject adaptive recommendations (Witte 1998). The EPPM (Witte 1992)  addresses the 
limitations of PMT by distinguishing the aspects of a stimulus that bring about the cognitive 
(danger control) from the aspects that bring about the emotional (fear control). EPPM posits that 
perceived efficacy (self-efficacy and response efficacy) is the determinant of whether it is danger 
control or fear control that is initiated, and perceived threat (severity and vulnerability) is the 
determinant of the intensity of the responses (Witte 1992).  The EPPM puts the focus back on the 
effect of the emotion, fear. According to Witte (1992; 1994), the manipulation of perceived 
efficacy activates the fear control (emotional affect based) processes and results in maladaptive 
response. When individuals are presented with high threat but presented with low efficacy 
solution to the threat, the user may feel that there is little chance that the solution (response 
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efficacy) will mitigate the threat.  Thus, the user enacts maladaptive responses, denial, 
avoidance, rejection etc. In order to represent both adaptive and maladaptive as separate and 
distinct responses to fear appeal, the proposed model (Figure 1) integrates PMT (dashed line) 
and EPPM. This study 
incorporates both 
message acceptance that 
leads to adaptive 
responses, and message 
rejection that leads to 
maladaptive responses in 
order to fully understand 
the effect of fear appeals 
in persuading and motivating individuals in InfoSec. Perceived threat (severity and 
vulnerability), perceived efficacy (response efficacy and self-efficacy), and perceived financial 
well-being affect CMI. We conceptualize intention to use CMI as the danger control and 
cognitive aspect of adaptive response. On the lower right side of the model is the integration of 




Threat appraisal includes severity and vulnerability of threat. Severity is the degree to which 
individuals see the consequences of being an IDT victim as severe (i.e., how severe the damage 
caused by identity theft will be). Vulnerability is the probability that the individual will be an 
IDT victim. Severity of IDT can be the loss of income, denial of credit for home or car purchase, 
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the out-of-pocket expenses for its resolution, and the resolution duration which can last years. 
IDT has been the number one complaint to the FTC fifteen consecutive years (FTC 2015; ITRC 
2014). Another indication of the rising tide and vulnerability is that more than 12.6 million adults 
in the U.S became victims of identity theft and lost a total of $21 billion to the thieves. Given the 
severity and vulnerability of the IDT occurrences, we expect that individuals intend to use CMI 
to control that danger. Response efficacy is the belief that the adaptive response will work, and 
that taking the protective action will be effective in averting the threat (Maddux and Rogers 
1983). Self-efficacy is the belief that it is possible to implement the protective behavior. 
Together, both response efficacy and self-efficacy are termed perceived efficacy. When 
individuals believe that CMI will control the danger of IDT (i.e. high perceived response 
efficacy), and believe that they are capable of seeking and acquiring CMI (i.e. high self-
efficacy), they will be willing to use CMI. 
H1: Perceived severity positively influences intention to use CMI. H2: Perceived vulnerability 
positively influences intention to use CMI. H3: Response efficacy positively influences intention 
to use CMI. H4: Self-efficacy positively influences intention to use CMI 
When individuals view losses from IDT as severe and perceive their vulnerability to experience 
IDT, we expect that this would generate fear. Fear is a negatively valenced emotion. We posit 
that if the severity and vulnerability of the threat of an identity theft is perceived, then fear will 
be an outcome of that perception. Therefore we hypothesize: 
H5: Severity positively influences perceived fear. H6: Vulnerability positively influences 
perceived fear 
Research on EPPM notes that fear affects intention when fear is high. That is, when fear is low, 
it does not have an effect on intention to self-protect, instead it has the opposite effect. It 
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backfires. The boomerang effect of fear appeals is when fear decreases protection motivation 
instead of increasing it. Hence, low fear leads to maladaptive responses and not to adaptive 
responses. Results from prior research shows that there is no relationship between fear and 
adaptive response (intention) when there is low fear appeal manipulation (Boss et al. 2015). 
Based on the EPPM and the prior empirical results, we expect a direct effect of fear on intention 
to use CMI only when fear is high. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H7a: When high, fear has a direct effect on intention to use CMI. H7b: When low, fear has no 
direct effect on intention to use CMI 
IDT represents a threat to the human asset, that is, the financial and psychological well-being of 
the individual (Kahn and Liñares-Zegarra 2015; Sharp et al. 2004). Johnston et al. (2015) argue 
the importance of including personal relevance factors in theories explaining protective behavior. 
Hence, we expect that an individual’s perception of their financial well-being (human asset) will 
affect their intention to use CMI. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H8: Perceived financial well-being positively influences intention to use CMI 
FEAR CONTROL 
EPPM suggests that perceived threat is the main contributing factor that determines how strong a 
response will be (intensity), whereas perceived efficacy is the main contributing factor that 
determines whether danger control or fear control processes is activated (Witte and Allen 2000). 
The notion is that when individuals doubt the efficacy of the recommended response, that is, 
when there are questions whether the recommended response will work (i.e. low perceived 
response efficacy) or when they doubt their ability to take the recommended action (i.e. low 
perceived self-efficacy), individuals will be motivated to control or reject their fear. This is 
usually done through denial or defensive avoidance (e.g. I am not at risk of identity theft, it 
cannot happen to me”). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
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H9: When threat is high and there is low response efficacy and low self-efficacy, there will be a 
higher degree of maladaptive responses (denial, avoidance) than when there is high response 
efficacy and high self-efficacy 
METHODOLOGY 
We will examine the proposed research model and hypotheses using an experiment. The EPPM 
suggests that the manipulation of the perceived efficacy denotes whether danger control or fear 
control process are enacted. Therefore, we intend to manipulate both perceived efficacy and 
threat by varying the levels of threat (severity and vulnerability) and efficacy (response efficacy 
and self-efficacy) in a 2 (high, low threat) x 2 (high, low efficacy) design. The responses of the 
participants will be measured immediately after the experiment. Our sample will include both 
students and non-students.  All measures will be from the literature and adapted to the context of 
the current study. Severity, vulnerability, fear, self-efficacy, response efficacy and intent will be 
adopted from Boss et al. (2015) and Milne et al. (2002). Denial and avoidance will be adapted 
from Witte (1994). Financial well-being will be adapted from Prawitz et al. (2006). 
EXPECTED RESULTS 
We expect that perceived threat (severity and vulnerability) and perceived efficacy (self-efficacy 
and response efficacy) will be positively associated with intention to use CMI. In integrating 
EPPM with PMT, we also expect to show the importance of fear in understanding and predicting 
either the protective adaptive response represented with intention to use CMI or maladaptive 
defensive responses. This study seeks to highlight the need for IDT research in IS, and also add 
to literature. 
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